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Abstract
We analyze a novel method for improving the eciency of pollution permit markets
by optimizing the way in which emissions are exchanged through trade. Under full-
information, it is optimal for emissions to exchange according to the ratio of marginal
damages. However, under a canonical model with asymmetric information between the
regulator and the sources of pollution, we show that these marginal damage trading
ratios are generally not optimal, and we show how to modify them to improve eciency.
We calculate the optimal trading ratios for a global carbon market and for a regional
nitrogen market. In these examples, the gains from using optimal trading ratios rather
than marginal damage trading ratios range from substantial to trivial, which suggests
the need for careful consideration of the structure of asymmetric information when
designing permit markets.
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zDepartment of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.Incentive-based environmental regulations, such as permit markets or emissions taxes,
have typically been designed to minimize the costs of achieving emissions targets.1 Focusing
on reducing abatement costs simplies program implementation by eliminating the need to
quantify damages from emissions of pollution. However, advances in air and water quality
modeling now make it feasible to estimate damages precisely and thereby to incorporate them
into program design. This suggests that regulators should turn from the narrow criterion
of minimizing abatement costs to the more general criterion of eciency that accounts for
both abatement costs and damages (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009).
In this paper we demonstrate a novel method for improving the eciency of pollution
permit markets by optimizing the way in which emissions are exchanged through trade. In
our model, there is asymmetric information, and sources of pollution are dierentiated by
the number of permits they are required to hold for each unit of emissions. When sources
trade permits, these dierentiated requirements govern the exchange of emissions, and hence
they are typically called trading ratios. Several recent studies have shown that selecting
trading ratios equal to the ratio of expected marginal damages can substantially increase
eciency relative to the one-for-one trading found in many permit markets (Williams III,
2002; Farrow et al., 2005; Muller and Mendelsohn, 2009; Henry et al., 2011; and Fowlie and
Muller, 2013.) Taking this as a point of departure, we ask if further eciency improvements
are possible. The rather surprising answer is yes. We characterize the optimal trading ratios
and show that they generally depart from the marginal damage trading ratios.
The main reason for this result is the presence of asymmetric information about the costs
of reducing pollution between the sources and the regulator that designs the market. Indeed,
in a rst-best environment with full information, the optimal trading ratios are equal to the
ratios of marginal damages. However, permit markets are generally employed to allow rms
to respond exibly to private information about their abatement costs. This information is
typically not available to the regulator when the regulator designs the program. In such a
second-best environment, the regulator must account for the damages from pollution as well
as the uncertainty about abatement costs when selecting the optimal trading ratios.
1In practice, these regulations have proven quite successful (Carlson, et al., 2000; Ellerman, et al., 2000;
Keohane, 2006; Fowlie, et al., 2012).
1To understand how this leads to a divergence between the optimal trading ratios and
marginal damage ratios, consider uniformly mixed pollution such as greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. In this case, marginal damages are equal across sources, and the marginal damage
trading ratios actually imply one-for-one trading. But one-for-one trading is generally not
the most ecient structure. Due to the asymmetric information, the regulator cannot set
the aggregate permit endowment (i.e. the \cap") at the ex post optimal level. The cap is
either too tight, in the case costs are higher than expected, or is too loose, in the case costs
are lower than expected. Using trading ratios that are not one-for-one enables the regulator
to partially circumvent this problem. By giving relatively favorable trading ratios to sources
whose emissions are positively correlated with the market price of permits, the regulator
can, in eect, allow increased emissions when costs are high and require decreased emissions
when costs are low. These optimal trading ratios improve eciency relative to one-for-one
trading by allowing exibility in emissions even though the number of permits is xed at the
cap. The regulator obtains this ex ante eciency gain by tolerating an ex post eciency loss
due to the fact that the marginal abatement costs are not equal across sources.
The importance of determining optimal trading ratios is buttressed by three observations.
First, regulators have begun to incorporate trading ratios into a variety of existing and
proposed permit markets.2 The NOx Budget Program uses trading ratios to restrict banking
through a \ow control" provision. The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) uses trading ratios
to reduce uniformly the allowed emissions for each permit. The Cross State Air Pollution
Rule (CSPAR), which would have replaced CAIR but was invalidated by the courts, would
have used trading ratios through an \assurance provision" to reduce uniformly the emissions
per permit if emissions exceed a threshold. The failed Waxman-Markey legislation addressing
U.S. GHG emissions would have used trading ratios to implement costly borrowing. Despite
this growing use of trading ratios, optimal implementation of trading ratios has not been
studied.
Second, regulators are currently grappling with how to regulate non-uniformly mixed
pollution. Early pollution permit trading programs could yield large gains by simply reducing
2See Holland and Moore (forthcoming) for more details on each of these programs.
2the overall level of emissions.3 Because low-cost emissions reduction opportunities may have
already been realized, current programs must more carefully target emissions reductions to
high-damage areas in order to pass a cost-benet test.4 Permit markets with trading ratios
are well suited for this task. For example, in their analysis of the celebrated SO2 Acid Rain
cap-and-trade program established by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Henry et al.
(2011) argue that utilizing marginal damage trading ratios rather than one-for-one trading
would improve the eciency of the market. Optimal trading ratios oer the possibility of
even greater eciency improvements.
Third, proposed markets to limit GHG emissions would swamp existing permit markets
in size and scope. Ellerman and Buchner (2007) compare the Acid Rain Program, which is
the largest existing non-GHG program, with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) and note that the EU ETS is much larger even though it covers a smaller fraction
of total emissions than the Acid Rain Program.5 To address global climate change eectively,
similarly sized programs would need to be implemented throughout the world and then linked
together. The massive scale of such programs implies that eciency gains from using optimal
trading ratios could be quite large in absolute terms, even if they are small in relative terms.
Given these observations, it is not sucient to just delineate the optimal trading ratios,
we must also investigate the practical importance of using the optimal trading ratios rather
than marginal damage trading ratios. We accomplish this through the numerical analysis
of two pollution problems. The rst is a multi-country carbon emission market, and the
second is a nitrogen trading market for several rivers in North Carolina and Virginia. In
both cases, we show that the optimal trading ratios lead to eciency improvements relative
to marginal damage trading ratios. The magnitude of these improvements varies from sig-
nicant to trivial, depending in particular on the regulators' uncertainty about abatement
3The Acid Rain Program established by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments for regulating SO2 emissions;
the leaded gasoline trading program; and the RECLAIM program regulating NOx emissions in southern
California each had one-for-one trading over broad regions and a declining level of allowed emissions.
4For example, the US EPA recently attempted to modify the Acid Rain Program with CAIR and later
CSPAR, which was then struck down by the courts. The new programs attempt to account for spatial
heterogeneity in damages mainly by prohibiting trades across regions.
5The EU ETS covers approximately 11,500 sources, compared to about 3,000 for the U.S. SO2 program,
and the prepolicy emissions in the EU ETS were over two billion metric tons of CO2, versus sixteen million
(short) tons of SO2 in the U.S. program. In addition, the value of the allowances distributed under the EU
ETS is about $41 billion versus about $5 billion under the U.S. SO2 program.
3costs. These results suggest that regulators should give careful consideration to the structure
of asymmetric information when designing future permit markets.
Our analysis combines two prominent strands of the literature on incentive based regula-
tions. The rst strand follows the seminal work of Montgomery (1972) who introduced the
idea of trading ratios in permit markets. Montgomery recognized that, if damage from pol-
lution diers across sources, then emissions licenses should not simply trade one-for-one. His
proposed trading rules are consistent with marginal damage trading ratios.6 More recent
work estimates the marginal damage trading ratios for several prominent non-uniformly
mixed pollution problems (Muller and Mendelsohn, 2009; Henry et al., 2011; Fowlie and
Muller, 2013). The second strand of literature follows Weitzman (1974), who introduced
the idea of informational asymmetries in permit markets. Since the parameters of permit
markets must be set potentially years in advance, the regulator lacks information which will
be available to market participants when they make abatement decisions. This asymmetric
information has important implications for the choice of policy instruments and the result-
ing literature on \prices vs. quantities" is vast. But here we are interested in a dierent
question: What happens to Montgomery's trading ratios when we apply Weitzman's fun-
damental insight about asymmetric information? There has not been a systematic study of
this issue.7
The authors who come closest to disentangling the relationship between trading ratios and
asymmetric information are Fowlie and Muller (2013). In analyzing a model with quadratic
abatement costs and linear damages, they observe that, under asymmetric information, the
marginal damage trading ratios may not perform as well as simple one-for-one trading.
This suggests, of course, that there may be a completely dierent set of trading ratios that
dominate either benchmark. But they do not pursue this line of inquiry. To replicate their
result, we construct a simple numerical example in which one-for-one trading does indeed
dominate the marginal damage trading ratios. We go on to calculate the optimal trading
6Montgomery proposed trading at the ratio of the transfer coecients. The ratio of the transfer coecients
is exactly the ratio of marginal damages holding ambient concentrations at the other sites constant.
7A few authors have chipped away at the edges. Yates and Cronshaw (2001) and Feng and Zhao (2006)
determine the optimal intertemporal trading ratio in models with a specic damage function. Rabotyagov
and Feng (2010) observe that the trading ratios may not be equal to the transfer coecients, but their focus
is on cost-eectiveness, rather than eciency.
4ratios and show that they perform better than either the marginal damage trading ratios or
one-for-one trading.
We also contribute to two other environmental regulation literatures. The rst is the lit-
erature on hybrid incentive-based mechanisms, which attempt to mitigate variance in permit
prices through, for example, price oors or ceilings supported by injections or withdrawals
of permits (Roberts and Spence, 1976).8 Optimal trading ratios oer an alternative, and po-
tentially complementary, mechanism to mitigate permit price variance. The optimal trading
ratios allow aggregate emissions to adjust to the permit price, thereby reducing its vari-
ance. The second is the literature on environmental taxes. It is well-known that emissions
trading and environmental taxes can each correct environmental externalities by pricing the
externality. Optimal trading ratios imply that, because of asymmetric information, trading
ratios should not simply reect expected marginal damages. Similarly, we show that source-
specic taxes generally should not equal expected marginal damages but should be adjusted
to reect abatement cost uncertainty.9
Section 1 presents the model and derives the main results, which characterize the slope of
the regulators objective when using marginal damages trading ratios. These results demon-
strate that marginal damage trading ratios are not optimal, show how marginal damage
trading ratios should be adjusted to improve eciency, and provide a rst-order approxi-
mation of the eciency gains from optimal trading ratios. Section 2 analyzes a special case
of the model in which the abatement costs and damages have the familiar linear-quadratic
form. We provide necessary and sucient conditions for the optimality of marginal damage
trading ratios and present closed form solutions for the regulator's objective studied in Sec-
tion 1. In Section 3, we present a simple two-source example of the linear-quadratic model.
This enables us to illustrate the intuition for the main results graphically and numerically.
Section 4 presents some preliminary calculations estimating the gains from optimal trading
ratios for two hypothetical emissions trading markets: a global carbon trading market and
a regional nitrogen trading market. Section 5 concludes.
8For recent contributions to this literature see Fell and Morgenstern, 2010; Hasegawa and Salant, 2011;
Gr ull and Taschini, 2011; and Stocking, 2012.
9This generalizes Chavez and Stranlund (2009) as they obtain their result in a model with quadratic
functions. Also Weitzman (1974) uses the optimal source-specic taxes to derive the comparative advantage
of prices vs. quantities formula in a quadratic model, but does not present the actual values for these taxes.
51 Model
There are n regulated sources of pollution. The description of a source varies depending on
the particular application of the model. For example, a source may correspond to a single
facility, or it may correspond to a large group of rms within the same sector of a given
country's economy. The abatement costs for source i are Ci(ei;i); where ei is the emissions
from source i and i is a parameter that inuences costs. Because abatement costs are in
terms of emissions, we dene marginal abatement costs as MACi   
@Ci
@ei . We assume costs
are convex in emission reductions, so that  
@Ci
@ei > 0 and C00
i 
@2Ci
@e2
i > 0: From the point of
view of source i, the cost parameter i is known when the abatement decision is made. From
the point of view of the regulator, i is random variable with positive expected value  i and
non-negative variance 2
i. We use the expression \cost shocks" to refer to various realizations
of these random variables. Let E = (e1;e2;:::;en) denote the vector of emissions.
These emissions cause damages, which are specied by a convex damage function D(E).
The marginal damage from source i is MDi  @D
@ei > 0. We say a damage function is regular
if it can be written as
D(E) = F
X
iei

(1)
for some convex function F and set of positive i's. Two familiar special cases of regular
damage functions are uniformly mixed pollution, in which i = 1 for every i, and constant
marginal damage, in which F is linear.
The regulator uses a permit market to ameliorate the damages from pollution. We assume
this permit market is competitive. Each source is given an endowment of permits wi and
the aggregate endowment is w =
P
wi. The sources face possibly dierent constraints on
the number of permits they must hold for each unit of emissions. These constraints are
described by a source-specic variable ri that is chosen by the regulator. In particular, if
source i emits ei units of pollution then they must hold riei permits. The ratio of rj to ri
reects the rate at which emissions of source i can be converted to emissions of source j
through the trade of permits between the two sources.10 If the ratio
ri
rj is the same for every
10Suppose source i decreases emissions by one unit. Then it can sell ri permits to source j, which in turn
can increase emissions by ri
rj.
6i and j, then we have one-for-one trading of emissions. Following the literature, we refer to
the ri's as trading ratios.
The choice variables for the regulator are nominally the trading ratios and the permit
endowments. However, because we assume the permit market is competitive, the market
equilibrium only depends on w and is independent of the distribution of the wi.11 More-
over, the permit market equilibrium is unchanged if the trading ratios and the aggregate
endowment are all multiplied by the same constant. Without loss of generality, then, we can
normalize the aggregate endowment as convenient. In our theoretical analysis we normalize
w to be equal to one.
Given a price p for permits, source i selects emissions to minimize the sum of abatement
costs and expenditures in the permit market. Source i's problem is
min
ei
Ci(ei;i) + p(riei   wi):
The rst-order condition for ei is
 
@Ci
@ei
= rip: (2)
An immediate consequence of this equation is that, if two sources have dierent trading
ratios, then their marginal abatement costs will not be equal, i.e., the regulation is not cost-
eective. Under our normalization of the aggregate permit endowment, the permit market
clearing equation is
X
i
riei = 1: (3)
The permit market equilibrium, conditioned on the regulator's choice of trading ratios, is
summarized by equations (2) and (3). This is a system of n+1 equations and n+1 unknowns
(each of the ei and p). It is useful to describe the solution to these equations as a function of
the vector of trading ratios R and the vector of cost parameters . Thus we have ei(R;),
E(R;), and p(R;).
To compute the optimal trading ratios, the regulator selects values for the trading ratios
to minimize the expected sum of abatement costs and damages. Thus the regulator's problem
11The analysis is unchanged if the regulator distributes permits with any non-distortionary method such
as through auctioning.
7is to choose R to minimize
W  E
"
X
i
Ci(ei(R;);i) + D(E(R;))
#
:
The corresponding rst-order condition for rj is
@W
@rj
= E
"
X
i

@Ci
@ei
+
@D
@ei

@ei
@rj
#
= 0 for j = 1;2;:::n: (4)
This implies that, on average, the marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal damages,
where the average is weighted by the
@ei
@rj's. There is not a simple closed form solution to the
rst-order conditions, even in a standard case in which the abatement cost functions and the
damage function are quadratic.
Now consider the intuitive, but ultimately inferior, approach to selecting the trading
ratios based on the ratio of expected marginal damages. This corresponds to selecting r1
and rj such that:
rj
r1
=
E[@D
@ej]
E[ @D
@e1]
for every j 6= 1: (5)
The system of equations dened by (2), (3), and (5) has 2n equations and 2n unknowns (ei,
p, and rj for j 6= 1). Let ei(r1;), E(r1;), p(r1;), and rj(r1;) be the solutions to these
equations as a function of r1 and the  vector. The regulator's problem in this case is to
nd the value for r1 that minimizes total expected costs:
min
r1
E
"
X
i
Ci(ei(r1;);i) + D(E(r1;))
#
:
The rst-order condition for r1 is
E
"
X
i

@Ci
@ei
+
@D
@ei

@ei
@r1
#
= 0: (6)
The rst-order condition implies that the regulator sets marginal abatement costs equal to
marginal damages on average where the average is weighted by the
@ei
@r1's.12 Let ~ r1 be the
12Although (6) appears similar to (4), note that there is no reason that (4) should should hold for every
8solution to (6) and let ~ rj  rj(~ r1;). We refer to the vector ~ R = (~ r1; ~ r2;:::; ~ rn) as the
marginal damage trading ratios.
If the damage function is regular, then the condition dening the marginal damage trading
ratios simplies considerably. Combining (1) with (5) implies
rj
r1
=
j
1
:
For example, if pollution is uniformly mixed, then the marginal damage trading ratios are
all equal to a common value and hence imply one-for-one trading.
The main result of our paper is to show that the marginal damage trading ratios will
generally not be equal to the optimal trading ratios. This may seem a bit surprising, so let
us rst give intuition for why it is indeed true before turning to a more formal analysis.13
Building on our discussion of this point in the Introduction, once again focus on the the
special case of uniformly mixed pollution. Here marginal damages are the same across
sources, so one might expect that the optimal trading ratios would be equal across sources
as well. To see why such one-for-one trading is, in fact, not generally optimal for uniformly
mixed pollution, consider the market equilibrium condition (3). Evaluating this at the
solution ei(R;) gives
X
i
riei(R;) = 1: (7)
Now suppose for the moment the market is indeed designed with one-for-one trading and let
r be the common value for the trading ratios. It follows from (7) that the sum of emissions is
equal to the constant 1
r, i.e., equal to the eective permit endowment. In general, however,
when the trading ratios dier between sources, the sum of emissions will not be constant, and
moreover, it will vary according to the realized values of . This suggests that permit markets
that do not use one-for-one trading have an interesting and under-appreciated feature. In
these markets, sources in aggregate emit more (or less) pollution depending on the actual
values of their abatement cost functions, even though the aggregate permit endowment is
xed.
j when (6) holds.
13Additional Appendix D gives a graphical analysis of why marginal damage trading ratios are optimal
only under full information and why optimal trading ratios dier from them under asymmetric information.
9The regulator, in turn, can use this feature to improve the performance of the permit
market. Because of the uncertainty about abatement costs, the regulator does not know the
ecient quantity of pollution. Loosely speaking, when aggregate marginal abatement costs
are high, the ecient quantity of pollution is large. When the aggregate marginal abatement
costs are low, the ecient quantity of pollution is small. The regulator can engender a similar
relationship between emissions and abatement costs by optimally selecting the trading ratios.
Now return to the formal analysis of the general case of an arbitrary damage function.
To show that the optimal trading ratios will generally not be equal to the marginal damage
trading ratios, we utilize the structure of the regulator's problem as well as the characteristics
of the marginal damage trading ratios to evaluate the derivative of the regulator's objective
function W at the marginal damage trading ratios. This gives us our main result (all proofs
are in the Appendix).
Proposition 1. The derivative of the regulator's objective function W with respect to rj,
evaluated at the marginal damage trading ratios ~ R, is given by
@W
@rj
   
~ R
= COV (p;ej) +
X
i
COV

~ rj
@D
@ei
  ~ ri
@D
@ej
;A
 1 aip
~ riC00
j

  COV
 
A
 1 X
i
ai
~ ri
@D
@ei
;ej
!
+ E
" 
p   A
 1 X
i
ai
~ ri
@D
@ei
!#
E[ej]
where the covariances and the expectations are also evaluated at ~ R, ai  r2
i=C00
i , and A 
P
i ai.
Proposition 1 shows that the derivative of W with respect to rj, evaluated at the marginal
damage trading ratios, can be written as the sum of n+2 covariances plus an additional term
which is the product of two expected values. If the overall sum of these terms is positive,
then the derivative is positive, and the objective function can be improved by decreasing the
trading ratio rj below the marginal damage trading ratio ~ rj. If this sum is negative, then the
derivative is negative, and the objective function can be improved by increasing rj above the
marginal damage trading ratio ~ rj. If this sum is equal to zero, then the derivative is equal
to zero, and the rst-order-condition (4) is satised at the point ~ R. In this case, the optimal
10trading ratio for source j is in fact equal to the marginal damage trading ratio ~ rj. We will
analyze the properties of the derivative in Proposition 1 through a variety of special cases
and numerical examples. But at this point, it is important to stress that there is no reason,
in general, that the overall sum should be equal to zero. In other words, the marginal damage
trading ratios are generally not optimal. Furthermore, to a rst-order approximation, the
eciency gain in moving from a marginal damage trading toward an optimal trading ratio
is given by the magnitude of the derivative in Proposition 1. This magnitude depends on
the marginal damages, the marginal damage trading ratios, and the uncertainty about price
and emissions generated by the uncertainty about the abatement cost functions.
An additional implication of Proposition 1 is that the optimal trading ratios lead to
ex post ineciency. Once again this is perhaps most clearly illustrated with the case of
uniformly mixed pollution. If trading ratios are not one-for-one, then by Equation (2), the
marginal costs are not equal. Aggregate abatement costs could be reduced by increasing
abatement from a low-cost source and decreasing abatement from a high-cost source. The
regulator tolerates this (second-order) loss in ex post eciency to obtain the (rst-order)
gain in ex ante eciency from using the optimal trading ratios.
Next consider a special case in which damage functions are regular as dened in (1). For
this special case, the derivative in Proposition 1 simplies considerably.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the damage function is regular. Then the derivative of the reg-
ulator's objective function W with respect to rj, evaluated at the marginal damage trading
ratios ~ R, is given by
@W
@rj
 
 
~ R
= COV (p;ej)j ~ R :
For regular damage functions, the optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage
trading ratios if and only if COV (p;ej), evaluated at ~ R, is equal to zero for every j. Although
both the cases of uniformly mixed pollution and linear damages have received considerable
attention in the literature, Corollary 1 appears to be a novel insight. In Section 3 we give
simple numerical examples in which the covariance is indeed not equal to zero, for both
uniformly mixed and linear damages.
Corollary 1 shows that, for regular damage functions, the optimality of marginal damage
11trading ratios depends on COV (p;ej). In particular, the regulator should decrease rj below
~ rj, i.e., oer source j a favorable trading ratio, if and only if COV (p;ej) is positive. Since
the permit price is driven by the marginal abatement costs, the permit price will be high
when marginal abatement costs are high. This is precisely the situation in which the total
permit endowment should be relaxed. By giving favorable trading ratios to the source whose
emissions are large when the permit price is high, the regulator can, in essence, relax the
aggregate emissions constraint in the event of high prices and hence improve eciency. This
result is illustrated graphically in Additional Appendix D.
Having shown that the optimal trading ratios will generally not be equal to the marginal
damage trading ratios, we now turn to characterizing the optimal trading ratios.
Proposition 2. The optimal trading ratios imply
E[p] = E
"
A
 1 X
i
ai
1
ri
@D
@ei
#
: (8)
The expression 1
ri
@D
@ei is equal to source i's marginal damage divided by its trading ratio,
which we interpret as the \normalized marginal damage". Proposition 2 shows that the
expected price is equal to the expected weighted average of the normalized marginal dam-
ages, where the weight ai is inversely proportional to the second derivative of the marginal
abatement cost functions. This generalizes the intuition that price should reect marginal
damage. We can further characterize the optimal trading ratios by taking the expectation of
(2) which gives E[p] = E[ 
@Ci
@ei ]=ri. Putting this together with (8) and dening \normalized
marginal abatement costs" analogously reveals that the expected normalized marginal abate-
ment costs are equal to the expected weighted average of the normalized marginal damages
for each source. This generalizes the intuition that marginal abatement costs should equal
marginal damages.
1.1 Optimal Source-Specic Taxes
We have shown that marginal damage trading ratios are generally not optimal. The regulator
can improve the performance of the market by adjusting the trading ratios such that expected
12price is equal to an expected weighted average of marginal damages where the weights depend
on the second derivative of the abatement cost functions. This raises the question as to
whether pricing mechanisms, such as pollution taxes, should be set to expected marginal
damages or whether they too should be adjusted under asymmetric information.
Suppose ti is the tax per unit of emissions for source i, and T is the vector of source-
specic taxes. As is well-known, the source will equate its marginal abatement costs and the
tax, so the rst-order condition for ei in the source's cost minimization problem is
 
@Ci
@ei
= ti: (9)
Let the solution to this equation be ei(T;). The regulator selects the source-specic taxes
to minimize the expected sum of abatement costs and damages. Thus the regulator's problem
is to choose T to minimize
W  E
"
X
i
Ci(ei(T;);i) + D(E(T;))
#
:
The rst-order condition of the regulator's objective with respect to tj is14
@W
@tj
= E
"
X
i

@Ci
@ei
+
@D
@ei

@ei
@tj
#
= E

 tj +
@D
@ej

 1
C00
j

= 0 (10)
Solving for tj implies that
tj =
E
h
@D
@ej=C00
j
i
E

1=C00
j
 = E

@D
@ej

+
COV

@D
@ej;1=C00
j

E

1=C00
j
 : (11)
Since in general there is no reason the covariance term in (11) should equal zero, it is generally
not the case that optimal source-specic taxes should equal expected marginal damages. We
see that optimal source-specic taxes should indeed be adjusted by a factor that depends on
14The second equality follows from (9) and from dierentiating (9), which implies
@ej
@tj =  1
C00
j and @ei
@tj = 0
for i 6= j.
13the second derivative of the abatement cost function.15
The optimal source-specic taxes in (11) are related to the theory of optimal taxation
rst studied by Ramsey (1927). In optimal Ramsey taxation, larger taxes are applied to
more inelastic goods. Note that 1=C00 is related to the abatement cost elasticity.16 Thus if
marginal damages are high when the abatement cost elasticity is high, then the second term
in (11) is positive and the optimal source-specic tax exceeds expected marginal damages
(i.e., is larger in the inelastic good). This intuition is illustrated graphically in the Additional
Appendix C.
2 A Linear-Quadratic Example
Additional insight into the the structure of the optimal trading ratios, the marginal damage
trading ratios, and the dierences between them can be gleaned from an example with
specic functional forms. In this example, the abatement cost function
Ci(ei;i) =
i
2

i
i
  ei
2
(12)
is quadratic and the marginal abatement cost function
 
@Ci
@ei
= i   iei (13)
is linear. We interpret i as the intercept and i as the slope of the marginal abatement cost
function. It is convenient to collect the i into the diagonal matrix . We assume that the
random variables i are independent.
The example features a quadratic damage function as well. We have
D(E) = W
tE +
1
2
E
tVE; (14)
where W is a vector with entries !i and V is a symmetric matrix with entries vij. Marginal
15In the special case of linear damages, @D=ei is non-stochastic so the second term in (11) is zero and the
optimal tax is simply marginal damages.
16The abatement cost elasticity is (1=C00)(P=e).
14damages are given by
@D
@ei
= !i +
X
k
vikek:
Some special cases are worth noting. First, if V is the zero matrix, then damages are linear
and marginal damages constant. Second, if !i = ! for every i and vij = v for every i and j,
then pollution is uniformly mixed.
A distinct advantage of the linear-quadratic example is that we can obtain simple closed-
form expressions for p and ej. These, in turn, enable us give an explicit expression for
COV (p;ej). We state this as the rst of several results for the linear-quadratic example.
(The proofs are in Additional Appendix A.)
Result 1. In the linear-quadratic example,
COV (p;ej) =
A 1rj
j
 
2
j
j
  A
 1 X
i
ai
2
i
i
!
: (15)
It follows that, if the damage function is regular, then the optimal trading ratios are equal to
the marginal damage trading ratios if and only if
2
j
j is the same for every source j.
We see that, for regular damage functions, the dierence between the optimal trading
ratios and marginal damage trading ratios depends on whether or not the abatement cost
functions exhibit a specic type of homogeneity. In particular, if the ratio of the variance
of the cost parameter 2
j to the slope of the marginal abatement cost function j is the
same across all sources, then the optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage
trading ratios. If, however, the ratios of the variance to the slope vary across sources, then
the optimal trading ratios are dierent from the marginal damage trading ratios.
Building on Result 1, we can quantify the eciency gains from moving from marginal
damage trading ratios to the optimal trading ratios. The slope of the regulator's objective
at the marginal damage trading ratios gives a rst-order approximation of these eciency
gains. For regular damage functions, this rst-order approximation for a small change in
rj is given by (15). Thus the relative gain from a small change in rj is larger if 2
j=j is
further from the weighted average of the 2
i=i's. If we adjust all the rj's from the marginal
damage trading ratios toward the optimal trading ratios, the rst-order approximation of
15the gain will be larger if the 2
j=j's are further from their weighted average, intuitively, if
the dispersion of the 2
j=j's is larger. A special case of regular damage functions illustrates
this intuition most clearly.
Result 2. In the linear-quadratic example, suppose that pollution is uniformly mixed and
that i = 1 for every i. To a rst-order approximation, the eciency advantage of the
optimal trading ratios relative to the marginal damage trading ratios is
1
~ r
p
n
v u
u t

1
n
 n X
i
 
2
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1
n
X
i
2
i
!2
:
The square root term in this expression corresponds to the standard deviation of the list
of numbers 2
1;2
2;:::;2
n. So for this special case, the eciency advantage of the optimal
trading ratios relative to the marginal damage trading ratios is increasing in the standard
deviation of the variances of the cost parameters. It is decreasing in the number of sources,
but at a slow rate, even with our assumption that the uncertainty is uncorrelated across
sources.
In summary, for regular damage functions, heterogeneity of abatement costs (through
dierences in the ratio of variance of cost uncertainty to slope of marginal abatement cost)
leads to a wedge between the optimal trading ratios and the marginal damage trading ratios.
The greater the degree of this heterogeneity, the greater the eciency advantage of the
optimal trading ratios.
Next consider arbitrary damage functions. To study these, we simplify the linear-
quadratic case by eliminating the abatement cost heterogeneity that was critical in our
discussion of regular damage functions. Accordingly, we have

2
i =  and i =  for every i: (16)
Under this restriction, we can characterize the regulator's objective as follows.
16Result 3. In the linear-quadratic example, suppose that (16) holds. Then we have
W =
X
Ci(E[ei];  i) + D(E[E]) +
2
22
 
 +
X
i
vii  
RtVR
RtIR
!
; (17)
where I is the identity matrix.
As we might expect, the quadratic functions yield a mean-variance structure for the
regulator's objective. Analyzing extreme cases allows us to further characterize the opti-
mal trading ratios. First, suppose that the variance 2 is close to zero. In this case, the
regulator's objective is approximately deterministic. It follows that the optimal trading ra-
tios are proportional to the marginal damages evaluated at the optimal emissions standards
(Yates 2002). Now suppose that the variance is large. Then the regulator's objective is
approximately equal to the 2
22 term in (17). Thus the regulator wants to select the values
for ri to maximize
RtVR
RtIR
:
This is the well-known problem of maximizing the ratio of quadratic forms. The solution
follows from Kaiser and Rice (1973). Let  be the largest eigenvalue of V. The optimal vector
R is equal to the eigenvector of V corresponding to this eigenvalue. In less extreme cases for
the variance, the optimal trading ratios reect a trade-o between these two benchmarks.
As the variance increases, the optimal trading ratios approach the eigenvector of V. As the
variance decreases, the optimal trading ratios approach the marginal damages evaluated at
the optimal emission standards.
We can also give a condition under which the optimal trading ratios are equal to the
marginal damage trading ratios.
Result 4. In the linear-quadratic example, suppose equation (16) holds, W = 0, and V is
invertible. Then the optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage trading ratios
if and only if E[] is an eigenvector of V:
Result 4 is similar in structure to Result 1. If the parameters of the abatement cost
functions satisfy a particular condition, then the optimal trading ratios are equal to the
marginal damage trading ratios. But this time the condition is dened with respect to
17the vector of expected values, rather than being a condition on the variances. Under the
conditions of Result 4, the marginal damage trading ratios, the expected emissions, and
the expected cost parameters all lie on the same ray from the origin. This ray is also an
eigenvector of V. It turns out that this eigenvector maximizes the quadratic form in (17),
which eectively eliminates concerns about uncertainty. Hence the optimal trading ratios,
which in general dier from the marginal damage trading ratio on account of such uncertainty,
oer no improvement relative to the marginal damage trading ratios in this case.17
Taken as a whole, the results for the quadratic example reinforce and enhance our ndings
from the general model. It is possible that the optimal trading ratios can be equal to the
marginal damage trading ratios, but this will generally not occur. The eciency gains from
using the optimal trading ratios will depend in a complicated manner on distributions of
both the expected value and variances of the random variables in the cost functions as well
as the interaction of these distributions with the properties of the damage function.
3 Numerical Calculations
In this section we use special cases of the linear-quadratic model to illustrate Corollary 1
with graphs and numerical calculations.18
3.1 Uniformly Mixed
We start with uniformly mixed pollution. Consider a simple example with two sources.
Source 1's marginal abatement costs are known with certainty. Source 2's cost shock can
either be high (H) or low (L) with equal probability. For convenience, we normalize the total
permit endowment such that the marginal damages trading ratios are unity, i.e., ~ R = (1;1).
Figure 1 shows the marginal abatement costs for each source, the two aggregate (or \mar-
ket") marginal abatement costs corresponding to the high and low outcome, and marginal
damages.19 The rst-best outcome occurs at the intersection of the appropriate market
17 In Figure 7 in Additional Appendix D, these points are not all on the same ray, so the marginal damage
trading ratios are not optimal.
18The code used to determine these results is available upon request.
19The market marginal abatement cost is found by horizontal summation of the sources' marginal abate-
18marginal abatement cost and marginal damages. The numerical values for emissions, prices,
and marginal abatement costs are given in Panel A of Table 1. Notice that the rst-best
outcome features variance in both prices and aggregate emissions: when costs are low, prices
and aggregate emissions are low and when costs are high, prices and aggregate emissions are
high.
Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 1 show the results for the marginal damage (one-for-one)
trading ratios. Because of asymmetric information, the rst-best outcome is not obtained.
In the event of the high cost shock, the total permit endowment is too small, marginal
abatement costs exceed marginal damages, and there is a deadweight loss relative to the
rst-best outcome. This deadweight loss is indicated by the upper triangle. In the event
of a low cost shock, the total endowment is too large, marginal abatement costs are less
than marginal damages, and the deadweight loss is the lower triangle. The marginal damage
trading ratios feature variance in price, but aggregate emissions are unchanged across the
two shocks.
The covariance between prices and emissions is of particular interest. Inspection of either
the data in Panel B of Table 1 or the relationship between the points in Figure 1 reveals
that COV (p;ej)j ~ R 6= 0 for either source. In fact, the covariance of emissions and prices are
negative for Source 1, but positive for Source 2. Applying Corollary 1 shows that eciency
can be increased by increasing Source 1's trading ratio, but decreasing Source 2's trading
ratio.
The optimal trading ratios are illustrated in Figure 2 and Panel C of Table 1. The optimal
trading ratio for Source 1 is larger than the marginal damage trading ratio. It follows that
the cost of emissions are higher for Source 1 and so its emissions are lower for both cost
shocks. This is reversed for Source 2. Relative to the marginal damage trading ratios, the
optimal trading ratios lead to a decrease in the variance in prices and an increase in the
variance in aggregate emissions. Moreover, aggregate emissions are larger in the case of a
high cost shock, but smaller in the case of a low cost shock. Thus the optimal trading ratios
provide a closer match to the features of the rst-best outcome than the marginal damage
trading ratios. Correspondingly, as shown in Panel B and C of Table 1, deadweight loss
ment costs.
19decreases when optimal trading ratios are used, but it does not disappear.20 The optimal
trading ratios cannot duplicate the rst-best outcome.
Table 1: Numerical example: uniformly mixed pollution
Panel A: First-Best
MAC1 price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2
Low Cost 13.33 n.a. 13.33 6.67 1.67 8.34
High Cost 16.67 n.a. 16.67 3.33 8.33 11.67
Panel B: Marginal damage trading ratios.
r1 = r2 = 1; DWL=2.08
MAC1 price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2
Low Cost 12.5 12.5 12.5 7.5 2.5 10
High Cost 17.5 17.5 17.5 2.5 7.5 10
Panel C: Optimal trading ratios
r1 = 1:03; r2 = 0:98; DWL=1.92
MAC1 price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2
Low Cost 12.89 12.55 12.23 7.11 2.77 9.87
High Cost 17.89 17.41 16.97 2.11 8.03 10.14
1 The example is parameterized by MAC1 = 20   e1; MACL
2 =
15 e1; MACH
2 = 25 e1; MD = 5+e1+e2 where high and low
costs occur with equal probability. Total permits are normalized
to 10.
3.2 Linear Damages
Consider another example of Corollary 1. The two sources and their abatement costs are
identical to those used in the example above, but damages are linear and dier across the two
sources. Source 1 has low marginal damages (MD1 = 10) and Source 2 has high marginal
damages (MD2 = 12). This example is also consistent with the model employed by Fowlie
and Muller (2013).
Table 2 illustrates the results for the marginal damage trading ratios, one-for-one trading,
and the optimal trading ratios. From (5), the marginal damage trading ratios satisfy r2 =
20Because the market is not cost eective ex post, the market marginal abatement cost is not simply
the horizontal sum of the source marginal abatement costs. Thus the deadweight loss cannot be simply
illustrated in Figure 2.
2012=10  r1. Panel A of Table 2 shows that, under marginal damage trading ratios, the value
for r1 is 0:92, so that r2 = 1:10. Thus the low damage source (Source 1) pays a relatively low
eective price for its emissions and the high damage source (Source 2) pays a relatively high
eective price for its emissions. The marginal damage trading ratios hold damages constant
across the two cost shocks, but allow aggregate emissions to vary.
Interestingly, one-for-one trading actually performs better than marginal damage trading,
even though pollution is not uniformly mixed in this example. As shown in Panel B of
Table 2, under one-for-one trading, the damages are not held constant across the cost shocks,
but the aggregate emissions are held constant. This leads to a lower deadweight loss than
marginal damage trading ratios, which veries Fowlie and Muller's observation that such an
outcome is possible in their model.
The optimal trading ratios have a lower deadweight loss than either of the other schemes.
Panel C of Table 2 shows calculations for the the optimal trading ratios. Since COV (p;e1) <
0, the optimal trading ratio for source 1 is greater than the marginal damage trading ratio
(0.96 vs. 0.93). On the other hand, since COV (p;e2) > 0, the optimal trading ratio for
source 2 is lower than the marginal damage trading ratio (1.04 vs 1.10). Under the optimal
trading ratios, neither the aggregate emissions nor the damages are constant across the cost
shocks. This exibility improves eciency.
4 Applications
We have established that the optimal trading ratios will generally be dierent from the
marginal damage trading ratios, even for uniformly mixed pollution. We now illustrate po-
tential policy implications of this observation by considering two permit trading applications.
4.1 Uniformly Mixed: Carbon Trading
Consider a stylized global carbon trading market. Ackerman and Bueno (2011) determine
simple two-parameter functions that characterize the cost of reducing carbon emissions for
21Table 2: Numerical example: linear damages with MD1 = 10;MD2 = 12
Panel A: Marginal damage trading ratios.
r1 = 0:93; r2 = 12=10r1 = 1:10; DWL=7.38
MAC1 price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2 Damages
Low Cost 7.54 8.21 9.05 12.5 5.95 18.45 196.0
High Cost 12.5 13.6 15 7.54 10.0 17.54 196.0
Panel B: One-for-one trading.
r1 = 1; r2 = 1; DWL=7.25
MAC1 price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2 Damages
Low Cost 8.5 8.5 8.5 11.5 6.5 18 193
High Cost 13.5 13.5 13.5 6.5 11.5 18 203
Panel C: Optimal trading ratios.
r1 = 0:96; r2 = 1:04; DWL=7.06
MAC1 price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2 Damages
Low Cost 8.10 8.40 8.67 11.9 6.24 18.14 193.9
High Cost 13.08 13.56 14.16 6.92 10.8 17.72 199.3
1 The example is parameterized by MAC1 = 20   e1; MACL
2 = 15   e1;
MACH
2 = 25 e1; where high and low costs occur with equal probability.
Total permits are normalized to 18, which would be the optimal emissions
with 1:1 trading.
22various geographic regions of the world.21 To apply these to our model, we interpret our
sources as regions and write Ackerman and Bueno's functions in terms of emissions rather
than emission reductions. This gives
 
@Ci
@ei
=
ai(bi(1 + i)   ei)
ei
;
where ai and bi are constants determined by Ackerman and Bueno. We interpret bi(1 + i)
as the stochastic business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. For simplicity we model the random
variable i with a three point symmetric distribution with zero expectation so that i takes on
the values f ki;0;kig with probabilities fi;1 2i;ig. For example, there is a probability
i that BAU emissions increase by ki percent over their expected value. We also assume
that the i are independent across regions. To complete the model we specify the marginal
damage function as
@D
@ei
= 
X
(ei   bi) + s;
where  (the slope of marginal damage) comes from Newell and Pizer (2003) and s (the
social cost of carbon at expected BAU) comes from IWGSSC (2010).
For tractability, we focus on the industrial sectors of the four regions with the largest
emissions: China, Europe, South/South East Asia, and the U.S. The results are given in
Tables 3 and 4. For a given set of parameters i an ki, we calculate the total expected costs
(expected sum of abatement costs and damages) under the optimal trading ratios and the
marginal damage trading ratios.
In Table 3, we consider symmetric abatement cost shocks (the tail probabilities i and
the percentage change in BAU emissions ki are the same across regions). Because China
has the largest BAU emissions, shocks to Chinese abatement costs drive the carbon price.
Hence Chinese emissions covary positively with price under marginal damages trading ratios,
and Corollary 1 implies that eciency can be improved by lowering China's trading ratio.
Indeed, China's optimal trading ratios are below one in each scenario, whereas the trading
ratios for the other regions exceed one in each scenario. For the largest uncertainty (ki = 0:5
21These functions are particularly easy to work with, but are not uncontroversial. A similar analysis could
be done with any integrated assessment model.
23Table 3: Carbon Trading with Optimal Trading Ratios: Symmetric Scenarios
i = 50% ki = 0:2
ki = 0:5 ki = 0:33 ki = 0:2 ki = 0:1 i = 25% i = 10%
Optimal trading ratios
China 0.877 0.946 0.981 0.995 0.990 0.996
Europe 1.082 1.037 1.013 1.003 1.007 1.003
S/SE Asia 1.133 1.055 1.019 1.005 1.010 1.004
U.S.A. 1.063 1.030 1.011 1.003 1.006 1.002
St. Dev. Price
Marginal Damage TR 38.534 25.694 15.418 7.709 10.902 6.895
Optimal TR 37.649 25.463 15.371 7.704 10.886 6.891
Expected Price
Marginal Damage TR 74.022 74.022 74.022 74.022 74.022 74.022
Optimal TR 73.838 73.997 74.023 74.023 74.024 74.023
Total Cost
First Best 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699
Marginal Damage TR 321.374 312.554 308.148 306.309 306.921 306.188
Optimal TR 320.665 312.424 308.132 306.308 306.917 306.187
Deadweight Loss
Marginal Damage TR 15.674 6.855 2.449 0.610 1.222 0.488
Optimal TR 14.966 6.725 2.432 0.609 1.218 0.488
Percent Reduction 4.5% 1.9% 0.7% 0.16% 0.33% 0.13%
1 The permit endowment is set so that the marginal damage trading ratios are 1. This represents
approximately a 50% reduction from BAU emissions.
2 Costs and deadweight loss (DWL) in billions of dollars. Prices in 2007 dollars per ton carbon
and i = 50%), optimal trading ratios reduce the deadweight loss by $0.5 billion or about
5%. For lower levels of uncertainty, the gains from optimal trading ratios are more modest.
In Table 4, we consider asymmetric cost shocks. Here China's abatement costs are
uncertain and the other regions' abatement costs are known. The gains from using optimal
trading ratios are more dramatic than in the symmetric case of Table 3. With a high level
of uncertainty about China's abatement costs (kChina = 0:5), optimal trading ratios reduce
the deadweight loss by about 22% or around $2 billion per year.
24Table 4: Carbon Trading with Optimal Trading Ratios: Asymmetric Scenarios
kChina = 0:5 kChina = 0:33 kChina = 0:2 kChina = 0:1
Optimal trading ratios
China 0.798 0.903 0.965 0.991
Europe 1.146 1.071 1.026 1.007
S/SE Asia 1.154 1.073 1.027 1.007
U.S.A. 1.152 1.072 1.027 1.007
St. Dev. Price
Marginal Damage TR 30.426 20.285 12.171 6.085
Optimal TR 27.113 19.312 11.966 6.060
Expected Price
Marginal Damage TR 74.023 74.022 74.022 74.022
Optimal TR 73.635 73.968 74.031 74.028
Total Cost
First Best 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699
Marginal Damage TR 315.270 309.934 307.220 306.079
Optimal TR 313.194 309.516 307.166 306.076
Deadweight Loss
Marginal Damage TR 9.571 4.235 1.521 0.380
Optimal TR 7.495 3.817 1.467 0.377
Percent Reduction 21.7% 9.9% 3.6% 0.9%
1 The permit endowment is set so that the marginal damage trading ratios are 1. This
represents approximately a 50% reduction from BAU emissions.
2 Costs and deadweight loss (DWL) in billions of dollars. Prices in 2007 dollars per ton
carbon.
3 For each column, the tail probabilities are China = 50% for China and ROW = 0% for
the other three regions.
254.2 Non-Uniformly Mixed: Nitrogen Trading
Our non-uniformly mixed policy application considers the trading of Nitrogen emission per-
mits between waste-water treatment plants (WWTP) located in North Carolina and Vir-
ginia. The data for this application is described in detail in Yates et al (2013) and Doyle
et al (2013). Briey, there are 51 waste-water treatment plants spatially distributed along a
river system that connects to a coastal estuary (see Figure 3). In the context of our model,
each WWTP corresponds to a source of pollution. The abatement costs and damages are
consistent with linear-quadratic example and, furthermore, i =  for every i. The value for
 is obtained from engineering cost estimates for reducing pollution at a generic WWTP.
There is a distinct advantage to using the linear-quadratic structure for policy applica-
tions of this type. The equations characterizing equilibrium in the permit market are linear
in emissions, so that expected total costs of a given policy are a functions of the rst and
second powers of the random variables i. Thus we do not need to make explicit distribu-
tional assumptions about the random variables. Rather we just need to specify the mean
and variance of the distributions. The expected value for the cost parameters,  i, are based
on the size of the WWTP. The variances, 2
i, are scaled proportionately to the expected
values, so that a single parameter  captures the \percent error" in the random variables.22
Damages are measured at 96 sites along the river system and in the estuary. The damage
function is given by
D(E) =
1
2
(AE + Y )
tB(AE + Y ):
In this expression, E is the vector of emissions of nitrogen from the 51 WWTP, Y is the
vector of background levels of Nitrogen from non-point sources at the 96 measurement sites,
B is a diagonal matrix with entries bjj (interpreted as the slope of marginal damage at
site j), and A is a transfer matrix that maps emissions from the WWTP through the river
system to the measurement sites. The elements of Y and A are determined by matching
the location of the WWTP and measurement sites to the output of the USGS maintained
SPARROW model (Hoos and McMahon 2009). For simplicity we assume that the bjj = b,
22The standard deviation of each random variable is

100(
E[i]
2 ), so that it is very likely that a realization of
the random variable lies within  percent of the expected value (for a normal random variable the probability
is 0.95).
26and that b is within the range determined by Yates et al (2013).
We determine the optimal trading ratios and the marginal damage trading ratios as
a function of the parameters  and b. The parameter  measures the magnitude of the
uncertainty about abatement costs. The parameter b measures the magnitude of the severity
of damages from emissions. The results for various parameter combinations are shown in
Table 5. The ratio of the largest trading ratio to the smallest is consistently larger for the
optimal trading ratios than for the marginal damage trading ratios. The optimal trading
ratios decrease the price dispersion relative to the marginal damage trading ratios. They
also increase the dispersion in total emissions. Now consider the parameter combination in
the rst column of Table 5. For this case, all 51 marginal damage trading ratios and all 51
optimal trading ratios are shown in Figure 3.
The percent reduction in deadweight loss from using optimal trading ratios rather than
marginal damage trading ratios varies quite a bit according to the values for the parameters.
The percentage reduction is generally substantial and greater than in the carbon example.
As we would expect from our analysis of the quadratic example, the distributions for the
uncertainty parameters 2
i and  i play a critical role in determining these reductions. There
are a few WWTP that have large expected values (and hence large variances) relative to
the other WWTP.23 In the Appendix, we show that simply taking the WWTP with the
largest expected value and articially reducing its expected value to be equal to the average
expected value (and hence its variance to be equal to the average variance as well) changes the
reduction in deadweight loss from 75 percent to 28 percent. Furthermore, if we assume that
all WWTP have the same expected values and variances, then the reduction in deadweight
loss is much less than 1 percent, but it does not equal zero.
5 Conclusion
We analyze a model of asymmetric information between a regulator and sources of pollution
and show that optimal policies are not based simply on expected marginal damages. In
23These WWTP have large output, and it is assumed that the expected value is proportional to output,
and the variance is proportional to expected value.
27Table 5: Nitrogen Trading with Optimal Trading Ratios
Uncertainty Percent Error  = 10  = 5
Slope of MD b = 30 b = 60 b = 90 b = 30 b = 60 b = 90
Trading ratios
Max Marginal Damage 3.553 3.580 3.607 3.553 3.580 3.607
Min Marginal Damage 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.063 0.064 0.066
Max Optimal 6.553 5.088 4.598 5.009 4.214 3.956
Min Optimal 0.015 0.035 0.048 0.035 0.055 0.061
St. Dev. Price
Marginal Damage TR 2.171 2.157 2.143 1.085 1.079 1.072
Optimal TR 0.525 0.829 1.080 0.420 0.669 0.820
Expected Price
Marginal Damage TR 2.737 5.327 7.777 2.739 5.328 7.778
Optimal TR 1.635 3.907 6.280 2.024 4.618 7.179
St. Dev. Total Emissions
Marginal Damage TR 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.019 0.019 0.019
Optimal TR 0.055 0.048 0.044 0.024 0.020 0.019
Expected Total Emissions
Marginal Damage TR 4.842 4.780 4.791 4.842 4.780 4.719
Optimal TR 4.846 4.783 4.722 4.844 4.781 4.720
Total Cost
First Best 9.773 19.240 28.419 9.771 19.236 28.412
Marginal Damage TR 9.870 19.336 28.512 9.796 19.260 28.436
Optimal TR 9.798 19.281 28.471 9.782 19.253 28.432
Deadweight Loss
Marginal Damage TR 0.097 0.095 0.094 0.024 0.024 0.023
Optimal TR 0.024 0.040 0.053 0.010 0.016 0.019
Percent Reduction 74.9% 57.8% 43.8% 56.9% 31.4% 18.6%
1 The permit endowment is set to the sum of the optimal pollution standards.
2 Costs and deadweight loss (DWL) in millions of dollars per year.
3 Prices in dollars per pound.
4 Emissions in millions of pounds per year.
28the context of pollution permit markets, we nd that optimal trading ratios (trading ratios
which maximize ex ante eciency) generally depart from marginal damage trading ratios.
The gains from optimal trading ratios depend on the sum of various covariances and expected
values. In simple cases, such as uniformly mixed pollution or linear damages, the gain is
simply determined by the covariance of the price and a source's emissions. In particular, if
a source's emissions covary positively with the market price of permits, then the regulator
can improve eciency by giving the source a relatively favorable trading ratio. Intuitively,
this favorable trading ratio allows additional emissions|despite a xed cap|in precisely
the case when the cap is set too tight from an ex post perspective. In the context of an
emissions tax, our results imply that the regulator can improve ex ante eciency by setting
source-specic taxes according to a Ramsey-like rule which adjusts the expected marginal
damages to account for the covariance of marginal damages with the slope of the marginal
abatement costs.
Our theoretical analysis shows that it is possible for a regulator to improve the eciency
of pollution permit markets by using optimal trading ratios. However, whether the regu-
lator should implement optimal trading ratios depends crucially on whether the benets of
optimal trading ratios are sucient to oset any additional regulatory costs which might
arise from a more complicated regulatory scheme. To estimate the magnitude of possible
benets, we compare optimal trading ratios to marginal damage trading ratios in two policy
environments: a global carbon trading market and a nitrogen trading market for watersheds
in North Carolina and Virginia. The results from these calculations show that the benets
vary from signicant to trivial depending the characteristics of the regulator's uncertainty
about abatement costs.
We did not estimate the additional regulatory costs, but in many respects, the optimal
trading ratios are no more costly to implement than the marginal damage trading ratios,
especially for non-uniformly mixed pollution. Both require the regulator to estimate marginal
damages by analyzing models of emission transport through the relevant physical space in
conjunction with models mapping emissions into harm to humans and ecosystems. Both
require moving away from the intuitively appealing and easy to explain cost-eectiveness
criterion. And both give the regulator discretion to give dierential regulatory requirements
29to the various sources of pollution, thereby potentially opening the door for the sources to
lobby or litigate for a more favorable treatment. The only additional cost of optimal trading
ratios would appear to be the cost of estimating the parameters for the random variables in
the abatement cost functions.
Guided by Weitzman (1974), the variance of abatement cost uncertainty has traditionally
been viewed as the reason why price and quantity instruments may perform dierently.
Weitzman shows that the superior instrument can be determined by comparing the relative
slopes of the marginal abatement cost and the marginal damage functions. Once the superior
instrument has been determined, regulators simply focus on expected costs and damages.
On the contrary, our analysis suggests a more fundamental role for the variance of abatement
cost uncertainty. In particular, this variance should be incorporated into the design of the
policy instrument itself, not just inform the choice between policy instruments.
30Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
From (2) and (3), the equilibrium for the optimal trading ratios is dened by the n   1
equations
@Ci
@ei =ri =
@Cj
@ej =rj for each i 6= j and by the equation
P
i riei = 1. Dierentiating
the n   1 equations with respect to rj gives
C00
i
ri
@ei
@rj
=
 
@Cj
@ej
r2
j
+
C00
j
rj
@ej
@rj
=
p
rj
+
C00
j
rj
@ej
@rj
for each i 6= j (18)
where the rst equation follows from dierentiating and the second equation follows from
the denition of (2). Dierentiating
P
i riei = 1 with respect to rj implies that
X
i
ri
@ei
@rj
+ ej = 0 (19)
which implies that
 ej =
X
i
ri
@ei
@rj
=
X
i6=j
r2
i
C00
i
p
rj
+
X
i
r2
i
C00
i
C00
j
rj
@ej
@rj
=
p
rj
X
i
r2
i
C00
i
 
prj
C00
j
+
C00
j
rj
@ej
@rj
X
i
r2
i
C00
i
where the rst equality follows from rearranging (19), the second equality follows from sub-
situting in (18), and the third equality follows from algebra. Solving this equation implies
that
C00
j
rj
@ej
@rj
=
"
X
i
r2
i
C00
i
# 1 
rjp
C00
j
  ej

 
p
rj
(20)
which implies from (18) that
C00
i
ri
@ei
@rj
=
"
X
i
r2
i
C00
i
# 1 
rjp
C00
j
  ej

for each i 6= j: (21)
Substituting (2) into the derivative of the regulator's objective with respect to rj as shown
31in (4) gives
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 1 X
i
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C00
i
@D
@ei
!
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#
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"
X
i
A
 1

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riC00
j
(rj
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@ei
  ri
@D
@ej
)

+
 
p   A
 1 X
i
ai
ri
@D
@ei
!
ej
#
(22)
where the second equality follows from subsituting (19), (20), and (21), and the rest follow
from algebra and the denition of ai and A.
Next recall that that COV (X;Y ) = E[XY ] E[X]E[Y ]. Applying this formula repeatedly
to (22) and noting that ~ rjE
h
@D
@ei
i
= ~ riE
h
@D
@ej
i
by the denition of marginal damage trading
ratios establishes that:
@W
@rj
   
~ R
=
X
i
COV

~ rj
@D
@ei
  ~ ri
@D
@ej
;A
 1 aip
~ riC00
j

+ E
" 
p   A
 1 X
i
ai
~ ri
@D
@ei
!
ej
#
:
Applying the covariance formula to the expected value term on the right gives us the equation
in the proposition. 
Before proving Corollary 1, we rst prove a Lemma about the marginal damage trading
ratios that holds provided damages are regular.
Lemma 1. Suppose that damages are regular. For the marginal damage trading ratios, the
regulator selects ~ R such that
E
"
p   A
 1 X
i
ai
ri
@D
@ei
#
= 0
where ai  r2
i=C00
i and A 
P
i ai
32Proof of Lemma 1.
From (2) and (3), the equilibrium for marginal damage trading ratios is dened by the n 
1 equations
@Ci
@ei =ri =
@C1
@e1 =r1 for each i 6= 1 and by the equation
P
i riei = 1. Dierentiating
the n   1 equations with respect to r1 gives
 
@Ci
@ei
r2
i
ri
r1
+
C00
i
ri
@ei
@r1
=
 
@C1
@e1
r2
1
+
C00
1
r1
@e1
@r1
:
(To derive this equation, we have used the fact that (5) and (1) imply that @ri=@r1 = ri=r1).
By substituting in p this implies that
C00
i
ri
@ei
@r1
=
C00
1
r1
@e1
@r1
(23)
for each i 6= 1. Dierentiating
P
i riei = 1 implies that
X
i
ri
@ei
@r1
+
X
i
ri
r1
ei = 0 (24)
which implies that
 1
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=
X
i
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=
X
i
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C00
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=
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C00
1
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X
i
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i
C00
i
where the rst equality comes from
P
i rie1 = 1 and rearranging (24), the second equality
follows from substituting in (23), and the third equality follows from algebra. Solving this
equation shows that
@e1
@r1
=
 1
C00
1
"
X
i
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i
C00
i
# 1
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 a1
r2
1
A
 1
which implies
@ei
@r1
=
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 1
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i
"
X
i
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i
C00
i
# 1
=
 ai
r1ri
A
 1 (25)
from (23).
33Substituting (2) into (6), the rst-order condition for r1, gives
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i
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#
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"
p
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 
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i
@D
@ei
ai
rir1
A
 1
#
(26)
where the second equality follows from subsituting in (24) and (25). Multiplying through by
r1 establishes the result. 
Proof of Corollary 1. From Lemma 1, it follows that the formula in Proposition 1 can be
written as
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= COV (p;ej) COV
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 1 X
i
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:
Because the damage function is regular, we have
~ rj
~ r1
=
j
1
:
It follows from (3) that
P
iei =
P 1
~ r1 ~ riei =
1
~ r1 is a constant. Next consider the marginal
damage function
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iei)i = F
0

1
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
i:
This is non-stochastic, and so (5) implies that @D
@ei=~ ri = @D
@e1=~ r1 for every i. Substituting these
expressions into the partial derivative above gives
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where the third equality follows since ~ r1 and @D
@e1 are non-stochastic.
34Proof of Proposition 2.
Start with derivative of regulator's objective function. Expanding (22) gives
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Simplifying and then collecting terms gives
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Now take the weighted sum of the rst-order conditions :
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Using (3) and the denition of ai it follows that
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from which the desired result follows directly.
35Table 6: Nitrogen Trading with Optimal Trading Ratios: Sensitivity to Distribution of Cost
Parameters
Baseline Convert Convert
 = 10 all largest
b = 30 to average to average
Trading ratios
Max Marginal Damage 3.553 5.025 4.755
Min Marginal Damage 0.063 0.077 0.098
Max Optimal 6.553 5.048 6.878
Min Optimal 0.015 0.077 0.012
St. Dev. Price
Marginal Damage TR 2.171 0.844 0.816
Optimal TR 0.525 0.843 0.465
Expected Price
Marginal Damage TR 2.737 2.103 1.749
Optimal TR 1.635 2.101 1.347
St. Dev. Total Emissions
Marginal Damage TR 0.038 0.025 0.037
Optimal TR 0.055 0.025 0.040
Expected Total Emissions
Marginal Damage TR 4.842 4.847 4.107
Optimal TR 4.846 4.848 4.110
Total Cost
First Best 9.773 8.440 6.443
Marginal Damage TR 9.870 8.461 6.462
Optimal TR 9.798 8.461 6.457
Deadweight Loss
Marginal Damage TR 0.097 0.021 0.020
Optimal TR 0.024 0.021 0.014
Percent Reduction 74.9% .003 % 28.7%
1 The permit endowment is set to the sum of the optimal pollution
standards.
2 Costs and deadweight loss (DWL) in millions of dollars per year.
3 Prices in dollars per pound.
4 Emissions in millions of pounds per year.
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Figure 1: Marginal Damage Trading Ratios with Uniformly Mixed Pollution
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Figure 2: Optimal Trading Ratios with Uniformly Mixed Pollution
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41Additional Appendices
A Proofs of Results for the Linear-Quadratic Example
Preliminary Calculations
In analyzing the linear-quadratic model, it is rst useful to derive a number of formulas.
First, note that ai = r2
i=C00
i = r2
i=i is non-stochastic so A =
P
i r2
i=i is also non-stochastic.
We can solve for emissions and prices by combining (2) and (13) which gives
ej =
j   rjp
j
: (27)
Substituting this into (3) and solving for p gives
p = A
 1
 
X
i
rii
i
  1
!
: (28)
This allows us to calculate the variance of the price, V AR(p) as
V AR(p) = (A
 1)
2 X
i
V AR

rii
i

= (A
 1)
2 X
i
ai
2
i
i
: (29)
Several covariances are also useful. Using (28) and the fact that the random variables are
independent gives
COV (p;j) = A
 1COV (
X
i
rii
i
;j) = A
 1rj
2
j
j
: (30)
The covariance of emissions is
COV (ej;ek) =
1
jk
COV (j   rjp;k   rkp)
=
1
jk
[COV (j;k)   rjCOV (p;k)   rkCOV (j;p) + rjrkV AR(p)]
=
1
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 1
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j
+
2
k
k

+ rjrk(A
 1)
2 X
i
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i
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:
#
=
1
jk
"
COV (j;k)   rjrkA
 1
 
2
j
j
+
2
k
k
  A
 1 X
i
ai
2
i
i
!
:
#
(31)
With these in hand, we turn to proving the results for the linear-quadratic example.
1Proof of LQ Result 1. To prove the rst part, we have
COV (p;ej) =
1
j
(COV (p;j)   COV (p;rjp)) =
1
j
(COV (p;j)   rjV AR(p))
=
A 1rj
j
 
2
j
j
  A
 1 X
i
ai
2
i
i
!
; (32)
where the rst equality comes from substituting (27) for ej, the second equality comes from
algebra, and the third equality comes from substituting (30) for COV (p;j) and (29) for
V AR(p).
To prove the second part, notice that Equation 32 implies that the covariances, evaluated
at any R, will all be equal to zero if and only if
2
j
j is equal to the same constant for every j.
The desired result now follows from Corollary 1. 
Proof of Result 2. Consider the rst-order Taylor series expansion of W at the point ~ R. We
have
W(R)  W( ~ R) + rW  (R   ~ R);
where rW = (@W
@r1; @W
@r2;:::; @W
@rn) is the gradient. It is well known that the vector -rW=jrWj
points in the direction of maximum decrease in the function W. So we have
W(R)   W( ~ R)   rW  (rW=jrWj) =  jrWj
gives the rst-order approximation to the eciency advantage of the optimal trading ratios
relative to the marginal damage trading ratios. From Corollary 1 and Result 1 we have
@W
@rj

  
~ R
= COV (p;ej) =
A 1~ rj
j
 
2
j
j
  A
 1 X
i
ai
2
i
i
!
:
It follows that
jrWj =
v u u
t
n X
i

A 1~ rj
j
2  
2
j
j
  A 1
X
i
ai
2
i
i
!2
:
This expression holds for all regular damage functions. Now we use the additional infor-
mation in the statement of the result to further simplify it. Because pollution is uniformly
mixed we have ~ rj = ~ r for every j. Combining this with  = 1 implies that ai = ~ r2 and
A 1 = 1
n~ r2. So the expression above simplies to
jrWj =
v u u t
n X
i

1
n~ r
2  
2
j  
1
n
X
i
2
i
!2
;
2and further to
jrWj =
1
~ r
p
n
v u u t

1
n
 n X
i
 
2
j  
1
n
X
i
2
i
!2
;
from which the result follows directly. 
Proof of LQ Result 3.
To evaluate the regulator's objective, we begin by evaluating expected abatement costs.
From (12), expected abatement costs for i are
E[Ci(ei;i)] =

2
E
"
i

  ei
2#
=

2
V AR

i

  ei

+

2

E

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
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2
=

2
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rip


+

2
 i

  E[ei]
2
=
r2
i2
2
P
r2
i
+ Ci(E[ei];  i): (33)
where the third equality follows from (27) and the fourth from (29).
Now carry out a similar manipulation of the damage function
D(E) =
1
2
X
i
X
j
vijeiej +
X
!iei:
We have
E[D(E)] =
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j
vijE[eiej] +
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=
1
2
X
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vij (COV [ei;ej] + E[ei]E[ej]) +
X
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=
1
2
X
i
X
j
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vijrirj
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3where the fourth equality follows from (31). In this expression I is the identity matrix and
Rt is the transpose of R.
Summing (33) over i and adding it to (34) establishes the result. 
Proof of Result 4.
We start with two preliminary observations. First, we can write (5) in vector form as
R = kVE[E]
for some constant k. Under (16), we can write simplify the expression for ej in (27) and
substitute into the above, giving
R =
k

V(E[]   RE[p]):
This can be written as
R +
k

E[p]VR =
k

VE[]
and
(I +
k

E[p]V)R =
k

VE[]: (35)
Second, we note that the eigenvectors of a matrix X are the same as the eigenvectors of
the matrices X 1, (I + qX), and (I + qX) 1 where q is a scalar constant.
Proceeding to the main proof, we now show that if E[] is an eigenvector of V, then
the optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage trading ratios. Let Z be the
eigenvector of V and let  be its eigenvalue. Since E[] is an eigenvector of V, (35) implies
that
(I +
k

E[p]V)R =
k

E[]:
Solving for R gives
R =
k

(I +
k

E[p]V)
 1E[] = k1E[];
where the second equality follows since V and (I + qV) 1 have the same eigenvectors.
Having established that Rt is proportional to E[], we know that Rt is an eigenvalue of
V, and is also proportional to Z. Because E[] is positive, we know that the eigenvector Z
is positive. Furthermore, because V is symmetric, all eigenvectors of V are orthogonal. So
Z is the only non-negative eigenvector of V. It follows from the Frobenius-Perron Theorem
that  is at least as large as any other eigenvalue of V.
Now consider the regulator's objective (17). For the marginal damage trading ratios, the
regulator selects R to minimize this expression, subject to the constraint that R = kVE[E]
For any Rt that satises the constraint, we have established that Rt is an eigenvalue of V.
Thus for these Rt, the 2 term in the regulator's objective function is equal to a constant.
So marginal damage trading ratio ~ R minimizes the expected value term. This implies that
~ R is proportional to the marginal damages evaluated at the optimal emissions standards
(which maximize the expected value term for any R). Now once again appealing to Kaiser
4and Rice (1973), because  is at least as large as any other eigenvalue of V, it follows that ~ R
also minimizes the 2 term for any R. Since ~ R maximizes both terms of (17), there cannot
be any other value for R that leads to a greater value for the sum of these terms. Hence the
optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage trading ratios.
Next we show that if the optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage trading
ratios, then E[] is an eigenvector of V. From Proposition 1 we have
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From (16) and Result 1, we know that COV (p;ej) = 0 for every j. Thus the rst term in
this equation is zero. All the covariances in the second term are zero as well, because for the
quadratic model marginal damages are @D
@ej =
P
k vj;kek, and, in addition, ai is non-stochastic.
So the second term can be written as the sum of covariances of ej and p, which of course are
equal to zero. Now focus on the third term
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Substituting in the expression for marginal damage gives
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where the second equality follows from (16) and (31). Now, because the random variables
are independent, the COV (k;j) will be equal to 2 when k = j and 0 otherwise. So we
have
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:
Because the optimal trading ratios are equal to the marginal damage trading ratios, it must
be the case that
@W
@rj
  

~ R
= 0 for every j:
We can write this system of n equations in terms of the n variables ri using matrix-vector
notation. This gives
 
A 12
3
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i
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E[E] = 0:
5By Proposition 2, we know that rst expectation is equal to zero. It follows that ~ R is an
eigenvector of V .
Now, since ~ R is an eigenvector of V , it is also an eigenvector of (I+qV). Thus from (35)
we have
R =
k

VE[]
which implies
E[] =

k
V
 1R =

k
R;
where the second equality follows the fact that V and V 1 have the same eigenvectors. This
means that E[] is proportional to R, and hence E[] is an eigenvector of V as well. 
B Carbon Trading Computation
Ackerman and Bueno (2011) describes the adaptation of the well-known McKinsey abate-
ment cost curves for 2030 (from McKinsey & Company) for use in their integrated assessment
model (IAM) of global climate change named the Climate and Regional Economics of De-
velopment (CRED) model. The McKinsey curves are controversial for their estimates of
substantial quantities of negative cost abatement opportunities. Ackerman and Bueno cir-
cumvent this diculty by tting a simple two-parameter functional form through the positive
cost portion of the McKinsey abatement cost curves. The functional form is aiA=(bi   A)
where A is abatement and ai and bi are the tted parameters. The function goes through
the origin by assumption.
Figure 4 shows an example of the tted functional form and the McKinsey abatement
cost curve for the industrial sector in S/SE Asia. Note that the curve asymptotes to bi (the
vertical line on the right). Thus bi can be thought of as BAU emissions, i.e., the maximum
possible abatement. Note also that ai is the marginal abatement costs when emissions
(equivalently abatement) are half of bi.
We use the equations by converting them to functions of emissions (rather than abate-
ment) and by introducing stochastic BAU emissions. Thus the marginal abatement cost
curve is
 
@Ci
@ei
=
ai(bi(1 + i)   ei)
ei
:
Integrating the marginal abatement cost curve yields the total abatement costs
Ci(ei;i) = aiei   aibi(1 + i)ln(ei)
Note that abatement costs would be innite if emissions were zero. Also note that the
integration yields an unspecied constant of integration, so we calculate deadweight loss as
the dierence between the rst-best, full-information outcome and the policy of interest.
The appeal of this functional form is twofold. First, the function form is simple, and
we can introduce stochasticity in a transparent way. Second, because  
@Ci
@ei asymptotes to
zero, we need not worry about the boundary condition of nonnegative emissions. As long as
the price is positive, we safely have an interior solution and the second order conditions are
6satised.
To reduce the dimensions of the problem, we focus on the industrial sectors in the four
regions with the largest estimated bi's. These four regions are reported in Table 7. Table 7
reports the tted coecients for 2030 along with the actual emissions from 2006-2008. The
bi are reasonable approximations of BAU emissions.
The calculations are done in Mathematica. With four regions and three independent out-
comes of each random variable, there are eighty-one possible states of the world to evaluate.
To calculate the rst-best, full-information outcome, we calculate the optimal emissions cap
for each of the eighty-one states. Because marginal damage trading ratios for a uniformly
mixed pollutant imply one-for-one trading, the marginal damage trading ratios can be calcu-
lated by optimizing the emissions cap that minimizes the sum of expected abatement costs
and damages.
Calculation of the optimal trading ratios requires optimization over a four-dimensional
vector of trading ratios. We rst calculate the equilibrium that would result from trading
for a given vector of trading ratios. We then optimize the trading ratio vector to minimize
the sum of expected abatement costs and damages.
Figure 4: McKinsey Marginal Abatement Cost Curve and Ackerman-Bueno Approximation
Use of McKinsey abatement cost curves for climate economics modeling        WP-US-1102 
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The estimated values of A and B are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Marginal Abatement Cost Curve Coefficients
A B A B
Africa 23.12            0.60              64.50            0.28             
China 36.84            0.20              66.39            2.64             
Russia/Eastern Europe 9.68              0.10              36.80            0.57             
Europe 92.43            0.40              101.91          0.83             
L. America/Caribbean 2.28              0.92              51.53            0.37             
Middle East 6.79              0.05              46.53            0.37             
Other high-income 30.54            0.09              107.41          0.54             
S/SE Asia 26.23            1.36              53.90            1.28             
U.S.A. 75.41            0.16              64.74            1.39             
Units: A in $ / tC,  B in GtC
Land Use Sector Industry Sector
 
 
Use of (1) rather than the empirical curves simplifies cost calculations. For any carbon price p, (1) can 
be inverted to yield the quantity of abatement available at MAC(q) < p 
 
(2)       
 
Source: Ackerman and Bueno (2011)
C Illustrating Optimal Source-Specic Taxes
Figure 5 illustrates optimal source-specic environmental taxes from (11). The gure illus-
trates marginal damages and \high" and \low" marginal abatement costs for a single source
where the high and low costs occur with equal probability. If marginal abatement costs
in the low-cost state are MACL
1 , then the slope of the marginal abatement costs are equal
across the two states; the COV term in (11) is zero; and the regulator should set the source-
7Table 7: Coecients for Industry Marginal Abatement Cost Curves Coecients and Fossil-
Fuel Emissions
ai bi Emissions
China 66.39 2.64 2.02
Europe 101.91 0.83 1.19
S/SE Asia 53.90 1.28 0.56
U.S.A. 64.74 1.39 1.72
Coecients from Ackerman and Bueno
(2011).
The ai coecient is the marginal abate-
ment cost when emissions are half of
BAU in $ per ton C. The bi coecient is
the maximal possible abatement, which
can be interpreted as BAU in GtC.
Emissions (from fossil fuels and cement
manufacture) are from the World Bank
database averaged across 2006-08 in
GtC.
specic tax equal to expected marginal damages. As illustrated, the resulting emissions in
the high-cost state are eH and in the low-cost state are eL.
However, if marginal abatement costs in the low-cost state are MACL
2 , then the slope of
the marginal abatement cost curve is greater in the low-cost state, and the COV term in (11)
is positive. In this case, the regulator can increase eciency by setting the source-specic
tax above the expected marginal damage. In fact, in the extreme case in which MACL
2 is
perfectly inelastic, the regulator could attain the rst best by setting the source specic tax
such that MD = MACH.
D Illustrating Optimal Trading Ratios
The intuition of optimal trading ratios is illustrated in Figures 6, 7, and 8. Figure 6 shows
convex iso-damage and iso-cost curves for two sources of emissions. Points further from the
origin have higher damages. Abatement costs are minimized at Point A, the unregulated
emissions vector, and increase at points further away from Point A. The sum of abatement
costs and damages is minimized somewhere along the locus of tangencies of the iso-cost
and iso-damage curves. The separating hyperplane theorems imply that a regulator can
implement the ecient emissions vector by trading under an emissions cap. An emissions
cap which implements (e
1;e
2) is illustrated in Figure 6. The slope of the emissions cap
budget, r1=r2, is the trading ratio and reects trading between the two sources. By the
implicit function theorem, the slope of the emissions cap budget should equal the ratio of
marginal damages. This is the theoretical basis for marginal damage trading ratios.
With uncertain abatement costs, the theoretical basis for marginal damage trading ratios
8Figure 5: Optimal Source-Specic Taxes
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no longer holds. Figure 7 interprets the solid iso-cost circles as the expectation and the
dashed iso-cost circles as realizations of the costs. The illustrated emissions trading cap
represents the marginal damages trading ratios. As illustrated abatement costs are lower
when reaching the emissions trading cap under the upper-left abatement cost realization.
Thus, we call this the low-cost state and its unregulated emissions vector is labeled AL. On
the other hand, abatement costs are higher when reaching the emissions trading cap under
the lower-right abatement cost realization. Thus, we call this the high-cost state and its
unregulated emissions vector is labeled AH.
Since the price of permits reects the marginal abatement costs, the permit price is high
in the high-cost state, and emissions from Source 1 are positively correlated with the permit
price in Figure 7. Since this is the marginal damages trading ratio cap, the rst term of the
equation in Proposition 1 is positive, which would imply that the regulator may be able to
improve eciency by decreasing r1. However, in general there are additional terms in the
equation in Proposition 1. In the special case of regular damages|as dened in (1)|the
slope of the regulator's objective is given by COV (p;ei).
The case of regular damages is illustrated in Figure 8. With regular damages, the iso-
damages curves are parallel lines with slope 1=2. Thus the marginal damages trading
ratios hold damages constant. However, as illustrated the regulator can increase eciency
by tightening the cap in the low-cost state and loosening the cap in the high-cost state. This
is the result in Corollary 1. Since COV (p;e1) > 0, the regulator can improve eciency by
reducing r1, i.e., by attening the emissions trading budget line as illustrated by the lighter
shaded line.
9Figure 6: Optimal Trading Ratios Across Two Sources: No Uncertainty
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Figure 7: Optimal Trading Ratios Across Two Sources: Uncertain Marginal Abatement
Costs
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10Figure 8: Optimal Trading Ratios Across Two Sources: Regular Damages
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